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The informal credit market is of crucial importance in the rural areas in Pakistan, 
even after decades of considerable development of formal credit organisations and of 
subsidised credit programmes by the government. This is due mainly to the fact that 
informal credit relations are embedded in the economic, political, and social interaction 
networks of the inhabitants in the rural areas. These interaction networks also maintain 
the direct credit costs and the transaction costs at a low level. However, the national 
development policy underestimates or even negates the significance of the informal 
financial market. Here, political action is required for initiating change. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The lack of capital and the absence of attractive investment opportunities are 
considered to be important reasons behind inadequate economic development in 
many developing countries. This is why an attempt is made in most developing 
countries to encourage, through development policy measures, capital formation as 
well as the supply of financial means in the form of credit through official financial 
institutions. The hypothesis of a financial bottleneck thus has led to the establishment 
of credit systems predominated by the government to finance the necessary 
investments in urban and rural areas of most developing countries. 
In Pakistan as well, specific government credit programmes have been 
implemented through the establishment of a formal system of credit organisations in 
the rural areas. In addition to the supply of mostly subsidised credits, it was 
necessary to establish a system of financial organisations in central places to 
guarantee their physical accessibility. Thereby, the expansion of the formal credit 
system itself was considered to be a component of the development process [von 
Pischke et al. (1983); Mittendorf (1987), pp. 6 ff.]. Does the expansion of the formal 
credit system actually satisfy the needs of potential customers? This question will be 
discussed by taking Pakistan as an example. 
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GOVERNMENT CREDIT POLICY 
In the past decades, the formal credit system has been expanded in the rural 
areas of Pakistan through the establishment of an infrastructure of credit organisa-
tions (banks, cooperatives, etc.) and with the help of special credit programmes 
oriented towards target groups. Thus, the conditions were created to guarantee the 
supply of credit to potential customers. Simultaneously, the possibilities of 
facilitating money-saving were also created so that a functioning rural financial 
market exists [Qureshi (1984); Berger (1986); Manig (1990); Fiege (1992)]. The 
following credit organisations that implement special programmes exist in the rural 
areas in Pakistan: 
 • Taccavi loans. In emergency situations, the government grants credit directly 
to farmers. 
 • Agricultural credit and multi-purpose cooperatives. Cooperatives provide 
credit facilities at a low rate of interest to their members, very often the 
influential members of the managing board. 
 • Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan (ADBP). The ADBP chiefly 
allocates medium- and long-term credit to farmers, cooperatives, and the 
agricultural processing industry (agro-business loaning programme) for 
investments and means of production. Security for the credit is furnished by 
material collaterals or by two guarantors. This is why most of the borrowers 
have been land-owners. The loans were utilised chiefly for purchasing 
tractors, installing tube-wells, and buying mineral fertilizers. The access to 
loans at subsidised interest was barred to tenants and small owner-operators, 
even when special credit programmes were implemented. 
 • Government Commercial Banks. These banks (nationalised in 1974), since 
1974, have been bound by the government ‘Mandatory Credit Targets’ to 
grant loans to farmers for purchasing production inputs. The banks 
concentrate their activities on the allocation of short-term loans, for which 
material collaterals must also be provided. 
 • The State Bank of Pakistan. It grants rediscount credit to commercial banks 
and cooperatives and has, to that end, opened up a special rural credit fund 
[Qureshi (1984), pp. 111 ff.]. 
The banking system in the rural areas has been expanded considerably through 
the development of a network of branches. This applies mainly to the Punjab 
province which predominates in the economic sector. Thereby, the distribution of the 
regional offices and of the branches is subjected to the hierarchy of the settlement 
structure according to the Central Place Theory [Wanmali (1922), pp. 24 ff.]. Thus, 
in connection with the development of the communication infrastructure, the physical 
accessibility of the formal credit organisations is guaranteed to all rural inhabitants. 
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In addition, since 1972, the banks have been employing the so-called ‘Mobile Credit 
Officers’ (MCOs) who deal with all the formalities of loan allocation. Of the 
approximately 45,000 villages in Pakistan, more than 30,000 are served by the 
ADBP and 16,000 by the commercial banks through their branches and the MCOs 
[Maan (1988)]. As a result of the ‘Supervised Credit Schemes,’ the loan conditions 
of all the banks regarding interest rate, security, and loan ceilings have been 
harmonised. Especially, the banking security requirements cause the scarce credits to 
be principally allocated to landowners since they can provide material collaterals (see 
also the recent survey carried out by Malik et al. (1996, pp. 269). 
For short-term credits, two wealthy guarantors are required. For long-term 
credits, in contrast, the so-called ‘Passbook System’ was established. The landed 
property is recorded in the passbook which must be deposited with the lender. The 
interest rates are lower than those usually claimed on the market and are therefore 
subsidised by the government. Generally, in connection with the banking security 
requirements, this caused the scarce credits to be supplied only to specific rural 
inhabitants, namely, those who had at their disposal collaterals in the form of wealth 
and who, simultaneously, maintained good contacts with the staff of the bank. Thus, 
the traditional interpersonal relations network was transposed to the modern sector 
and predominates the activities. 
Other groups who do not maintain these interactive relations, which definitely 
prevail according to the principle of reciprocity, either have no access to such credits 
or the costs of access are excessively high. Due to that system, the élite groups are in 
a position to use the progressive development potential, which is made available by 
the modern credit markets, to maintain and perpetuate their power. Indeed, this 
system is undergoing changes, and is following the trend intended by the 
government, although at a very slow pace. The subsidised loans provided to members 
of the rural élites (landowners, businessmen, etc.) are not used for rural activities 
relevant to development exclusively but are also misused with the help of 
complicated mechanisms. 
 
RURAL FINANCIAL MARKET 
So far as the actual credit financing in the rural regions is concerned, what is 
the situation in Pakistan following the good development of the formal system? For 
analysis, reference will be made to two extensive official statistical surveys on credit 
structure conducted in 1972 (published in 1984) and 1985 (published in 1989). 
In 1972 (see Table 1), only 11 percent of the credit amounts borrowed by rural 
households was provided by formal credit organisations, mainly by the commercial 
banks and the ADBP. More than 89 percent of the credit was borrowed from 
informal sources; the principal lenders were friends and relatives who provided  
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almost 58 percent of the credit amounts, followed by tradesmen who supplied 16 
percent. If the number of loans is taken as a basis, only 7 percent came from formal 
sources. 
Table 1 
Distribution of Total Borrowings by Source and Type of 
Rural Household in Pakistan, 1972* 
—in percent— 
 
 
Credit Source 
 
Owner 
Operato
r 
Owner-
cum-
Tenant 
 
 
Tenant 
Owner 
Non- 
Operato
r 
Non-
Farm 
HH 
All 
Rural 
HH 
Formal Sources 
1.   Co-op Societies 
2.   Co-op Banks 
3.   ADBP 
4.   Commercial Banks 
5.   Taccavi 
6.   Unclassified 
Sub-total 
 
1.2 
0.4 
7.7 
4.2 
0.9 
0.3 
14.7 
 
0.9 
0.3 
3.3 
1.0 
0.4 
0.2 
6.1 
 
0.6 
0.2 
1.0 
0.9 
0.1 
0.2 
3.0 
 
0.5 
0.5 
2.7 
17.1 
0.2 
0.2 
21.2 
 
0.5 
0.1 
0.0 
6.2 
0.1 
0.1 
6.9 
 
0.8 
0.3 
3.7 
5.3 
0.4 
0.2 
10.7 
Informal Sources 
7.    Friends + Relatives 
8.    Money-lenders 
9.    Landowners 
   10.   Commission Agents/ 
       Merchants 
   11.    Factories 
   12.    Unclassified 
  Sub-total 
 
61.9 
2.3 
1.7 
 
15.5 
1.1 
2.8 
85.3 
 
68.9 
2.1 
5.4 
 
12.8 
0.4 
4.3 
93.9 
 
50.1 
1.9 
34.9 
 
7.3 
0.1 
2.7 
97.0 
 
52.0 
6.7 
0.4 
 
11.1 
0.6 
8.0 
78.8 
 
57.3 
1.6 
5.1 
 
23.4 
0.6 
5.1 
93.1 
 
57.8 
2.4 
8.1 
 
16.2 
0.7 
4.3 
89.3 
  Total      100      100      100      100      100  100 
Source:  Qureshi et al. (1984),  p. 158. 
*According to the Credit Survey conducted in 1973. 
 
In 1985 (see Table 2), the formal credit had increased to a range of about 29 
percent, especially as a result of the extension of the ADBP credits. Accordingly, the 
informal credit decreased to approximately 73 percent. Thereby, the loans obtained 
from friends and relatives and from tradesmen continued to predominate. 
Simultaneously, from 1972 to 1985, the nominal amounts of credits had increased 
from 3,700 million to 28,000 million Pakistani rupees. 
In the future, as a result of the increasing commercialisation of all economic 
sectors in Pakistan’s rural areas, the importance of formal institutionalised credit 
organisations will undoubtedly continue to grow. This applies particularly when 
large investments are to be financed by loans. Here, the informal credit market is 
usually overburdened. 
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Table 2 
Distribution of Total Loans by Source and Type of 
Rural Household in Pakistan, 1985* 
—in percent— 
 
 
Credit Source 
 
Owner 
Operator 
Owner-
cum-
Tenant 
 
 
Tenant 
 
Non-
Farm HH 
 
All Rural 
HH 
Formal Sources 
1.  Co-op Societies 
2.  ADBP 
3.  Commercial Banks 
4.  Taccavi 
5.  Others 
 Sub-total 
 
1.9 
29.4 
5.8 
0.1 
0.4 
37.5 
 
2.1 
26.3 
5.1 
0.1 
0.0 
33.6 
 
0.7 
1.0 
2.2 
0.0 
– 
4.0 
 
0.7 
4.0 
1.8 
0.0 
0.1 
7.0 
 
1.5 
20.3 
4.5 
0.1 
0.3 
26.7 
Informal Sources 
6.    Friends + Relatives 
7.    Money-lenders 
8.    Landowners 
9.    Commission Agents/ 
       Merchants 
10.     Factories 
11.     Others 
Sub-total 
 
46.0 
1.4 
1.0 
 
12.3 
1.2 
0.6 
62.5 
 
40.1 
1.3 
6.2 
 
17.6 
0.8 
0.5 
66.4 
 
35.2 
1.0 
45.9 
 
12.9 
0.5 
0.5 
96.0 
 
76.2 
1.4 
2.2 
 
9.2 
2.3 
1.8 
93.0 
 
49.1 
1.3 
8.1 
 
12.7 
1.2 
0.8 
73.3 
Total      100      100      100      100      100 
Source:   Govt. of Pakistan, Agricultural Census Organisation, Pakistan Rural Credit Survey 1985. Final report. Lahore, 
(1989), pp. 20-21.  
 *According to the Credit Survey conducted in 1985. 
 
In the case of informal credit, those supplied by friends and relatives 
predominated in 1972 and 1985 and this applies to all the groups of rural borrowers 
of credit. Landowners, too, borrow the largest volume of their credit from friends and 
relatives. In 1985, the share of non-agricultural rural households had increased 
considerably in comparison with 1972. For tenants, the landowners are traditionally 
important credit suppliers (cf. Tables 1 and 2). The opposite of the informal credit 
market is the informal saving of rural inhabitants. However, this will not be discussed 
at this stage. Here, the structure of the informal credit of rural households in Pakistan 
will not be dealt with in detail [see Manig (1990)]. The interesting aspect, in contrast, 
is the general reasons for the predominance of informal credit despite the good 
infrastructure of the formal credit organisations and the existence of appropriate 
credit programmes orientated towards target groups, on the one hand, and the neglect 
and negation of the informal market by development experts, on the other hand. 
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INFORMAL CREDIT MARKET 
Why does the informal credit market have such a great significance in the 
rural areas in developing countries and why has it been neglected by development 
experts? The discussion of the special features of informal credit should help to 
answer these questions [cf. also the various arguments in Adam and Fitchett (1992)]. 
Informal credit relations between lenders and borrowers in Pakistan are just as 
in other developing countries, embedded in the people’s economic, political, and 
social network of personal relations. Credit relations are only one component of a 
multi-stranded network of interactions between people. Since there are hardly any 
professional money-lenders in Pakistan, credit is very rarely the main purpose of 
interactive relations and has very often the complementary character of relations 
predominated by other aims (kinship, friendship, neighbourhood, economic, and 
political relations). Usually, these relations already existed before credit was taken 
and will still be maintained after the loan has been repaid. Thus, credit relations as 
such are not immediately identifiable and are perceived by those concerned only as a 
subordinate activity and not even considered as loans. 
The application of the New Institutional Economics Approaches to the 
informal credit relations shows that, as a result of the personalised interaction 
networks, the insecurities and bilateral shortage of information between lenders and 
borrowers can be reduced considerably. The embedding of credit relations in other 
economic and social interactions (e.g., marketing, tenancy, friendship, kinship, etc.) 
enhances at the same time the trust between the participants [Floro and Yotopoulos 
(1991), pp. 108]. 
So far as credit is concerned, the principle of reciprocity applies to economic, 
political, and social relations. This principle of reciprocity and the very often 
complementary character of informal credit implies that, when he grants credit, the 
lender expects and receives something which is marked by the predominating 
relation. In the case of relations predominated by politics, the return service can 
consist of loyalty and support in political disputes; in the case of relations of an 
economic nature, a trader, for example, secures for himself the marketing of the 
borrower’s products or a landowner seeks the guarantee of tenancy relations with the 
borrower. Very often, various motives overlap in the case of informal credit relations. 
The principle of reciprocity has also an effect in the case of friends and relatives 
since it is expected that the lender also receives support in specific situations. The 
individual credit relations and the possible motives will not be analysed at this stage 
[see, for Pakistan, Manig (1990), pp. 209 ff.; for India, Bouman (1989); for various 
developing countries, Adams and Fitchett (1992)]. 
The informal credit relations do not refer to supply but to demand, and are, 
therefore, adjusted to the borrower’s specific circumstances and individual 
requirements regarding modalities, amount, and terms. Thus, credit is available 
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wherever and whenever it is required. It is also determined by the participants’ role 
expectations. In Pakistan, usually, no interest is claimed for informal credit. Having 
been proscribed during the re-Islamisation process, interest rates have altogether lost 
their importance. Taking into account conditions under which professional money-
lenders dominate the informal credit market, the existence of formal institutional 
credit organisations may reduce the interest rates altogether. For Pakistan, however, 
this is important to a limited extent only. 
On the whole, all the credit costs, including the lenders’ and borrowers’ direct 
transaction costs, are likely to be lower in the case of informal credit relations than 
on the formal market. The transaction costs include the costs of information supply, 
enquiry, negotiation, agreement, control, risk and insecurity assessment, guarantee, 
control and enforcement of the agreements as well as the regulation of conflicts. 
Since a network of personal relations predominated by other aims exists between 
borrowers and lenders, and since credits are only one (very often only 
complementary) interaction, only marginal additional transaction costs arise in the 
case of credit relations. This applies especially to small amounts of credit. In contrast, 
all the transaction costs for maintaining the multi-stranded economic, political, and 
social relations network in rural societies in developing countries are likely to be 
high (mutual obligations, dependencies, gifts, and parties to maintain the relations, 
etc.). However, it is difficult to quantify transaction costs [Pollak (1985), p. 606] and 
to attribute them to the individual interactions. On the formal credit market, in 
contrast, all the credit costs (despite the fact that the interest rates are much lower due 
to government subsidy) are very high, especially for rural households that require 
low amounts of credit, and have no material collaterals as a result of high costs of 
access and lack of other relations. 
Raising a loan on the informal market usually substantiates the borrower’s 
personal dependence and, emotionally, a certain degree of inferiority vis-à-vis the 
lender. This is likely to be an important reason why élite groups try to avoid 
appearing on the informal credit market as borrowers. However, owing to their social 
position in a rural society they cannot afford to fail as creditors. The grant of this 
credit also substantiates then the borrower’s loyalty. 
The informal credit relations in the rural areas in Pakistan that exist as a 
component of a complex network of human interaction, as probably in many other 
developing countries, are difficult of access for a scientific analysis. This could 
surely be considered to be an important reason for unawareness and ignorance. 
Another important reason is undoubtedly the fact that available cash in traditional 
rural societies also increases the social obligation of lending this cash to members of 
the group in times of crisis or to help relatives. This is why products are only sold 
when cash is actually required for specific purposes. This is difficult to perceive for 
outsiders and fosters the notion that there is a general lack of capital. On the other 
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hand, these credit relations are altogether marred by the prejudice that they are 
exploitative. This leads undoubtedly to a considerable underestimation of its 
significance for the development of the rural society, especially in view of attaining 
the mass of small farmers and of the informal rural sector as a whole. When attractive 
investment opportunities exist and technologies are divisible, informal credit sources 
are surely of considerable importance for financing development, as examples from 
many countries have shown during the period of the ‘Green Revolution’. 
As the increased importance of the formal credit market in Pakistan between 
1972 and 1985 has shown, in the process of societal development and, therefore, in 
institutional change, the multiple personalised relations structures in the easily 
graspable village system orientated towards institutions that have different functions 
and specialised institutions. Indeed, very often the old relations are maintained 
parallel to modern institutions. This applies at present to the credit system in most of 
the developing countries. Since modern institutions such as the formal-legal credit 
markets still do not fulfil their function satisfactorily, traditional relations structures, 
such as informal credit, are justified in development policy. Therefore, the informal 
credit market must assume an important function when the economy attains a specific 
development level. The formal and the informal sectors complement each other and 
do not compete with each other. However, the traditional informal credit market is 
underestimated so far as its function in the social development progress is concerned, 
and even discriminated against. 
 
CONCLUSIONS FOR CREDIT POLICY 
As the example of Pakistan shows, the importance of the formal credit market 
is overestimated regarding its role in financing development. This is also 
undoubtedly due to the fact that there is considerable unawareness of informal credit. 
If the informal credit market is availed of at all, then very often in the extreme cases 
when exploitative structures exist. The importance of supplying formal credit is 
likely to be greatly overestimated especially for the group of disadvantaged marginal 
farmers, as even in the case of special credit programmes the target groups are only 
reached within the framework of the prevailing societal modes of distribution (land 
tenure, social system, power structure). Sufficient credit is no longer available to the 
actual target groups because funds are scarce. However, this diversion, which is 
termed ‘market imperfections of the credit institutions’ in the appropriate literature, is 
actually only the effect of the existing societal modes of distribution. 
The informal rural credit market is very heterogeneous and is always a 
component of the prevailing political, economic, and social relations network, 
involving relatively low additional transaction costs for credit supply. In north-west 
Pakistan, in the 1960s, the informal credit market was mainly relevant only for 
sectors that were not directly productive and through which the expenditure for 
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social obligations was met. In the meantime, however, directly productive 
investments are financed through this market [Fiege (1992), pp. 56 f.] since the 
informal credit market is much more appropriate to satisfy the credit needs of a large 
number of small farmers as multiple and differentiated sources exist, the supply is 
available everywhere, the conditions are very variable, and credit is simply a 
component of the comprehensive socio-economic relations network of the society. 
The latter advantage, precisely, is of considerable significance as a stabilising factor 
for marginal farmers at the time of critical social change. Thus, the traditional 
informal credit market also contributes, through the extension of the financing 
function of technological change, towards preventing a too considerable expansion of 
social polarisation in the modernisation process. Indeed, functioning ability is an 
indispensable prerequisite. On the other hand, social differences increase. 
The significance of informal credit relations for financing investment is being 
increasingly acknowledged by empirical surveys and by the former’s inclusion in 
theoretical concepts [cf. Adams et al. (1984); Seibel and Marx (1987); Adams and 
Fitchett (1992); Meyer and Nagarajan (1992); Murshid (1992); Bardhan (1989)]. 
Therefore, it is important to proceed from the fact that, with regard to saving 
formation and loans, the formal and the informal sectors complement each other and 
should thus be considered as a whole. 
In general, the effectiveness of establishing a formal credit system to satisfy 
the actual credit requirements within a short term is largely overestimated, at least 
insofar as the aim is to reach the lower agricultural income groups, since the 
government’s distribution policy bypasses the needs of small farmers in the 
prevailing societal modes of distribution in the rural areas. On the other hand, the 
informal credit market is underestimated. That is why, in terms of development 
policy, it would be worth considering whether a dualistic agricultural credit system 
(formal and informal credit market) should be promoted during a period of transition 
until the formal institutions become fully effective. This means strengthening the 
informal credit system in view of improving competition, transparency, and 
refinancing possibilities. The restricted informal sector only allows limited financial 
transactions. Refinancing through the formal institutionalised system, therefore, 
definitely will be a development measure of financial policy worth considering. 
Thus, a judicious contribution can be made towards the intended institutional change 
in rural societies. 
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